Diplomáticos estadounidenses expresaron su preocupación de que el favorito en las elecciones presidenciales de México, Enrique Peña Nieto, pagara una cobertura televisiva favorable en 2009, cuando era gobernador del Estado de México, según cables del Departamento de Estado publicados por WikiLeaks y dados a conocer este día por The Guardian.
“Las denuncias de que la cobertura por televisión nacional a favor de Peña Nieto, ha sido el detonante de una ola de manifestaciones estudiantiles en el período previo a las elecciones del 1 de julio”, agrega el influyente diario británico. Los reclamos, agrega, se apoyan en documentos vistos por The Guardian, que implican también a otros políticos en la compra de cobertura de noticias y entretenimiento.
“Un cable [diplomático], escrito poco después de que funcionarios de la embajada de Estados Unidos fueron llevados a una gira por el Estado de México cuando era gobernador Peña Nieto, dice:
Es un hecho ampliamente aceptado, por ejemplo, que el monopolio de la televisión Televisa respalda al gobernador y le proporciona una extraordinaria cantidad de tiempo de emisión y otros tipos de cobertura”.
El documento, que data de septiembre de 2009, se tituló:
Una mirada al estado de México, al estilo del Pueblo de Potemkin”.
“Pueblo de Potemkin” es una expresión utilizada para describir cuando alguien hace pasar por maravilloso algo que en realidad es un desastre:
La expresión Pueblo Potemkin o Pueblo de Potemkin o Pueblos Potemkin [del ruso Потёмкинские деревни, pa’tjɔmkɪn, más correcto sería la forma Pueblo Potyomkin] se debe al mariscal duque Grigori Alexandrovich Potemkin (1739-1791) para designar aldeas, pueblos, villas inexistentes en Crimea. Algo se define como Pueblo de Potemkin cuando se quiere describir una cosa muy bien presentada para disimular su desastroso estado real. A primera vista parece muy bien acabado y deja a todos impresionados, sin embargo le falta la substancia principal. Es más común la forma plural pueblos Potemkin. –Wikipedia
The Guardian dice que otro cable al inicio de ese mismo año hizo hincapié en la importancia que el entonces gobernador Peña Nieto le daba a asegurar convincentes victorias electorales del Partido Revolucionario Institucional en su estado en las elecciones intermedias del Congreso de ese mismo verano de 2009.
Peña Nieto, dice el cable citado por el diario británico, “ha puesto en marcha importantes proyectos de obras públicas en las zonas seleccionadas por los votos, y los analistas y los dirigentes priistas por igual han expresado en repetidas ocasiones [a funcionarios políticos de Estados Unidos] su creencia de que él está pagando a los medios de comunicación por dar noticias favorables sobre él en su cobertura, así como, supuestamente, financiar a encuestadores para influir en los resultados de la encuesta”.
Los cables filtrados desde la Embajada de Estados Unidos en México contienen frecuentes menciones sobre el poder que Televisa, y la otra cadena principal de televisión en México, TV Azteca, ejercen sobre la elite política del país. Las dos redes controlan alrededor de 90% de los canales gratuitos y son percibidas ampliamente como “hacedoras de reyes políticos”, añade en su nota de este lunes Jo Tuckman.
“Esto es particularmente claro en los cables que se ocupan de una nueva ley de comunicación que privilegiaba los intereses ya establecidos y fue aprobada por la legislatura en el centro de la campaña electoral de 2006”, agrega.
Uno de los cables, con fecha de febrero de 2006, destaca cómo el proyecto de ley fue aprobado por la Cámara de Diputados en tan sólo siete minutos, sin debate, y antes de que hubiera sido votada en la Cámara Alta.
“Con la temporada de campaña en plena marcha, parece que nadie quiere molestar a Televisa o Azteca (quienes tienen también mucho más que ganar) por temor a perder las principales ranuras de publicidad a buen precio”, plantea el cable citado por The Guardian.
El cable destaca conjeturas como que es “dudoso que cualquier senador quiera arriesgar su carrera política en el futuro por balancear la embarcación en un momento en que todos los partidos están decidiendo su futuro político”. Asimismo, el diplomático no identificado, quien escribió el cable, supone que no había casi ninguna posibilidad de que el entonces presidente, Vicente Fox, vetaría la ley “y el riesgo de alienar a Televisa”, agrega Tuckman.
Algunos legisladores adoptaron otra postura después de que el proyecto de ley fue aprobado y montaron un desafío legal que llegó finalmente en la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, donde las partes más polémicas fueron declaradas inconstitucionales, comenta.
La nota de The Guardian destaca que en lo que parecía ser una forma de venganza de la elite política en las redes, la recién elegida asamblea legislativa aprobó una reforma electoral en 2007 que prohibió la propaganda política pagada durante los periodos electorales y restringida fuera de ellos.
Esto, sin embargo, no cumplía con su objetivo de liberar a la política de la presión de los medios de comunicación, de acuerdo con un cable de Wikileaks fechado en junio de 2009, plantea Tuckman.
“En cualquier caso, los partidos y candidatos están bordeando las restricciones”, dice el cable. “Los periodistas y sus jefes han tenido más o menos libertad para dedicarse a la larga tradición electoral mexicana de vender impresión favorable y la cobertura de difusión a los candidatos y partidos”, concluye la cita de The Guardian a los cables de Wikileaks.
CABLE 1
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 001683 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PINR [Intelligence], MX [Mexico] SUBJECT: MEXICO,S NEW ELECTORAL REGIME PROVING DIFFICULT TO MANAGE Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason: 1.4 (b), (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. In the run up to the first national elections since electoral reforms were passed in 2007, it is clear that the electoral regime crafted by ongress is butting up against Mexico,s political reality. Criticism of the law's inconsistencies abound, and the only question is whether and when a groundswell will emerge in favor of revamping it once the dust settles after polling is completed. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) After the hotly contested elections of 2006, one of the first orders of business congress took up was an ambitious state reform effort, largely at the behest of both PRI and PRD leaders. Legislators failed to reach consensus on most of the broad political reform proposals, but found sufficient agreement to launch a reform of Mexico's electoral regime, which many thought had been stressed to its limits by the raucous 2006 presidential campaign and its bitter aftermath. In November 2007, Congress passed constitutional reforms that reorganized the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), shortened the campaign period considerably, radically changed campaign funding and imposed controversial restrictions on how campaigns could use media to influence voters. At the time, most observers questioned the utility of many of the reforms, which they either characterized as a sop by the PAN to an embittered PRD or as a sinister scheme by PRI leaders to condition future elections to their advantage. Below, we look at the three most significant -- and controversial -- of the measures designed to reform the way campaigns are conducted in Mexico. IFE,s Stewardship of Airtime for Parties/Candidates Poses Challenges ¶3. (U)One of the more controversial and problematic regulation this reform created was to place the IFE in charge of administering time on radio and TV for all parties in federal, state, and local elections. TV and radio stations are required to provide authorities with 48 free minutes of air time a day to run election ads. IFE has divided that time into 2 and 3 minute segments per hour of transmission, which is being distributed among the parties mainly based on their representation in Congress as a result of the last elections. The law expressly prohibits parties and private individuals from buying air time on TV or radio apart from the IFE allocated time. Only authorized parties can run ads &for the purpose of influencing voters and the election,8 and they can only do so during IFE authorized spots. ¶4. (U)Media moguls, commentators and many political figures branded this aspect of the reform as antithetical to free speech. Broadcast giants Televisa and TV Atzeca, concerned by the loss of revenues the restrictions imposed, have carried the fight furthest, and IFE,s response has only muddied the waters. A months long battle emerged between the two companies and the IFE in January and February that erupted when the two deliberately cut into the crucial moments of popular sports events with political ads continues. IFE sanctioned both broadcasters only to postpone the fines, and is now haggling over whether to drastically lower, or forgive the, sending mixed signals to the body politic. ¶5. (C)Parties and candidates are skirting the restrictions on media buys at any rate. Subsequent to the law,s passage, IFE reached an agreement with the Chamber for the Radio and Television Industry to protect journalists, freedom of speech. Since then, journalists and their bosses have been more or less free to engage in the time-honored Mexican electoral tradition of selling favorable print and broadcast coverage to candidates and parties. ¶6. (C)PRI and PAN, with their comparatively large unofficial campaign war chests and stables of friendly reporters and editors, have probably been able to engage more effectively in this practice than have PRD and the smaller parties. One IFE counselor told Poloffs that while hard to substantiate, most of the allegations his institution has received are probably true. Mexico,s National Autonomous University conducted a content analysis of media political coverage and concluded that while the PAN, its candidates and public officials identified with the party received slightly more attention than their PRI counterparts, coverage of PRI and its adherents was more oftentimes cast positively by media. UNAM also found that Media coverage of PRD trailed far behind MEXICO 00001683 002 OF 003 that of the two leading parties. ¶7. (U)Further muddying the waters, parties and broadcast outlets have openly challenged the proscription against &issues-oriented8 spots, outside the allotted 48 minutes, that are designed to appeal to voters, concerns without openly campaigning on behalf of a party or candidate. In one case, the Green Party (PVEM) was fined close to $800,000 USD for buying unauthorized ad time on TV, but successfully argued that the commercials were not propaganda but rather informative. IFE rescinded the fine, essentially leaving open the question of where to draw the line between public service ads and campaign spots. Negative Campaigning Prevails, Despite New Law ¶8. (U)Another controversial change in the legislation prohibited &negative8 campaigning, stating that &political or electoral propaganda that the parties distribute should abstain from expressions that denigrate institutions or parties or that slander people.8 However, while it specifies a range of fines and other penalties for engaging in denigrating or slanderous behavior, it fails to fully define what constitutes such behavior in the first place. ¶9. (U) Not surprisingly, this aspect of the legislation has also been hotly contested. PAN, in particular, has fought a long and expensive battle with IFE over its campaign ads and has been subjected to heavy fines. The Party,s most famous &negative8 ad was a word search puzzle run in magazines and newspapers that asked readers to find &characteristics of the PRI8 and included words like &poverty,8 &complacency8 and &corruption.8 After months of appealing an IFE decision that the ad constituted slander, PAN was forced to pay almost $100,000 USD. ¶10. (SBU) Of course, finger pointing between PAN and PRI over the question of corruption and organized crime continues unabated through a variety of channels, despite the restriction on negative campaigning. Battles rage in many locales over charges and counter charges of official complicity in the narco-trade ) none more bitter than in the state of Chihuahua whose governor stands accused of narco-ties by PAN leaders, and where a former PAN mayor, now candidate for a federal deputyship, was briefly arrested on malfeasance and corruption charges. Many analysts we have spoken with believe that PAN,s use of such tactics successfully chipped away at PRI,s once substantial edge that was demonstrated by early surveys. Incumbent Campaigning Restrictions ¶11. (SBU)The third key aspect of the 2007 reform was the attempt to prevent incumbent officials from political campaigning. The measure was seen as a response to the acrimony engendered during the 2006 presidential campaign, when President Fox unabashedly took to the airwaves to tout his party,s achievements and undermine opposition candidates. The restriction applies to all levels of government in Mexico. ¶12. (SBU)Again, the reform has generated more controversy than clarity. Federal, state and local entities have generally avoided blatant media campaigning on behalf of candidates from their parties, but many a government official has tailored his &official duties8 to maximize opportunities to lend support to favored candidates. In virtually every state in play for governorships, and in numerous localities around the country, charges of vote influencing have been lodged by opposition candidates against sitting governments. Most recently, PRI governors, with help from their PRD colleagues, have attempted to use the National Conference of Governors to denounce what they claim is the widespread use of federal social programs to influence voters, calling PAN &a would-be Santa Clause and giving out things that it is not his to give.8 ¶13.(SBU)The charge that the federal government uses its spending programs to cultivate voters is a long-standing one wielded by opposition politicians. Specific allegations will most likely never be investigated or substantiated. There is little doubt, however, that the PAN-led federal government's command of the law enforcement heights has provided advantage. Numerous broadcast ads highlighting the Calderon administration's commitment to clearing the streets of drug lords and petty traffickers are aired daily. Opposition parties are also charging that the federal government is using the tools at its disposal for political ends. Both PRI and PRD branded late May raids in Michoacan, which netted 28 state and local officials, an attempt by the president to MEXICO 00001683 003 OF 003 influence public opinion in favor of his party. Although a complaint was lodged with IFE, no action has been taken. Federal law enforcement officials deny they have staged such recent aggressive pushes into well known narco hot zones throughout the country to drive a point home to voters, and say that they are long overdue. ¶14. (C)Comments. The fears expressed last year that the electoral reforms would quash freedom of expression during the mid-term season have not been entirely borne out. Many observers believe this current election cycle has been singularly lackluster and ascribe it to the law. However, the kinds of free-wheeling activities the reform was designed to restrain continue. Ambiguities in the law, uneven application of its provisions and aggressive pushback by candidates and media have undercut its impact. IFE personnel feel their institution has been unfairly criticized by the media for its handling of the new legal framework, but admit privately that many of the reforms are unworkable. They expect to see an attempt to overhaul the new electoral regime before the 2012 elections. Whether Mexico,s legislators improve the law, or make a piece of bad legislation worse, remains to be seen. End Comment. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
CABLE 2
R 262238Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4824 INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL HQ USNORTHCOM DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC NSC WASHINGTON DC
TELEVISA DICE QUE THE GUARDIAN ACEPTÓ SU ERROR; NO ES ASÍ
LOS DOCUMENTOS DEL SUPUESTO PLAN DE TELEVISA, AQUÍ
DIARIO INGLÉS DEFIENDE SUS DOCUMENTOS COMO VÁLIDOS
LORET DE MOLA DICE QUE DOCUMENTOS DE PROCESO SON FALSOS
LOS PRIMEROS DOCUMENTOS DEL SUPUESTO ACUERDO TELEVISA-EPN
PEÑA NIETO DICE QUE ES “UN REFRITO” LO QUE PUBLICÓ THE GUARDIAN
HABLA EX COLABORADORA: LORET LE CONFIRMÓ QUE EL PLAN EXISTÍA
EN REUMEN: LO QUE PUBLICÓ THE GUARDIAN, LO QUE RESPONDIÓ TELEVISA
